by Harish Gupta, National Editor, Lokmat Group
Restraint surely has a “bottom line”, as the Chinese government spokesman reminded India. And that too after seven weeks of persistent effort by India to end, through negotiations, the standoff with the Chinese military in the Doklam plateau, a stone’s throw from the point where the boundaries of Sikkim, Tibet and Bhutan meet. India sent National Security Advisor Ajit Doval to Beijing to talk the matter over, but he came back empty-handed as China would not relent until hell freezes over.
China’s is typical bully’s logic. It questions India’s right to send troops, through a third country, Bhutan, into Doklam. But the ownership of the area is contested between Bhutan and China; it is anything but trespass by India to China’s territory. Further, the Indian action was in response to China constructing metal road that could bring artillery and tanks close to the thin land mass, the ‘chicken’s neck’, that connects the Indian plains with the eight north-eastern states. In 1962, when China and India went to war, the Chinese targeted that very spot as it moved its troops across Nathu La in Sikkim. Imagine how will China respond if India builds a string of missile bases that threaten the security of Tibet, or beyond?
While China says India must move back “with no strings”, and raises the pitch of its megaphone diplomacy, India’s policy-makers are in a double bind. On one hand, China is a goliath with GDP (in PPP terms) nearly three times that of India, and four times the southern neighbour’s military budget. On the other hand, India is saddled with a rather chaotic democracy in which the opposition turns even a foreign aggression into an opportunity to find fault with the government. China’s one-party rule doesn’t entertain the liability of gaining public support for its war efforts. In China, such leader’s accountability, if at all, may lie behind the closed doors at the forthcoming national congress of the communist party of China. There, President Xi Jinping’s return as chief of the party for another term is taken as given.
The Indian opposition criticism of the Modi administration’s handling of the Doklam standoff has three layers, all of which have supposedly originated from the Congress. At one level, it cribs about Modi’s public displeasure with Beijing about President Xi’s One Belt One Road (OBOR) policy by not attending a widely attended meeting of the OBOR invitees earlier this year (Bhutan, India’s friend, was the other absentee). At another level, the opposition brushes aside the government version of the standoff. Congress vice president Rahul Gandhi dramatized his personal spite for Modi when he stayed away from an External Affairs Ministry briefing of the opposition leaders but had a well-publicised meeting with the Chinese envoy in India, as though he were hearing the truth from the horse’s mouth. Moreover, the opposition would put down the Modi government’s foreign policy per se and present the imbroglio in the north-east Himalayas as part of a general policy dislocation.
External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj, in a robust speech in the Rajya Sabha last week, addressed most of these issues with clarity. She rightly expressed her dismay at some opposition politicians in India—a Congress member in this case—questioning India abstaining from the OBOR summit. “The OBOR link to Gwadar port in Baluchistan goes through Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (POK), which India considers as an integral part of our country. How does an Indian political party expect us to attend the OBOR summit?” Swaraj crafted a credible defence of Modi’s foreign policy—“for most of its terms, India under the Congress had Russia as ally and the US as enemy but, under Modi, both Russia and the US are friends”—and went all out against Rahul for his offensive gesture.
However, the opposition efforts to pin down Modi on the China issue can lead to a self-goal as public opinion generally turns red hot on patriotism during military confrontations with foreign countries, as it was evident in the 1962 war with China, the 1971 Bangladesh war with Pakistan or the 1999 Kargil war. Unless India gets a bloody nose in a decisive war with China, there is little chance of Modi’s popularity hurtling down (it happened to Jawaharlal Nehru after the 1962 defeat but there was plenty of public support during the war). Besides, much water has flown down the Brahmaputra between 1962 and 2017; there may still be a huge mismatch between the military prowess of the two countries but both have increased their power to wreak havoc on each other. That has minimised the chances of a full-scale war.
Still, there is little chance of India being able to clinch a deal with China anytime soon for peaceful resolution of the existing, and future, problems. Future, because China is known for shifting goal posts to cause unexpected problems. Like it is doing in South China Sea by rewriting history to lay claims on newer islands dotting it, or in twisting past agreements along the 4,000-km border with India and Bhutan. Beijing does not accept the McMahon line as it was an “imperialist legacy” but now swears by the 1890 Calcutta treaty between British India and China under the Quing government because it allows the country’s present rulers to move troops close to the Indian border.
China is in a hurry to establish its hegemony across Asia and fill up as much of the power vacuum caused by the US lowering its global profile. For India, it is a long-term diplomatic challenge. It is not a diplomatic chin wag for aspiring political amateurs to pompously show off their legacy connections.
