by Harish Gupta, National Editor, Lokmat Group
The US civil society is riled no end by the alleged Russian intervention in last year’s presidential election, with an eye on seeing Hillary Clinton defeated. The fact that she lost the election, and Donald Trump won, is read by a good section of the American media and public as the outcome of machinations by Russian president Vladimir Putin.
The US civil society is riled no end by the alleged Russian intervention in last year’s presidential election, with an eye on seeing Hillary Clinton defeated. The fact that she lost the election, and Donald Trump won, is read by a good section of the American media and public as the outcome of machinations by Russian president Vladimir Putin.
If true, it is unprecedented for the world’s biggest power to have its internal affairs remote-controlled by another country. However, for India, an even larger democracy than America, the “foreign hand” nudging domestic policy is an old chestnut. India under the late Indira Gandhi was regarded as ‘client state’ of the former USSR, with the government orchestrating its domestic and foreign policy in step with Moscow’s diktat. Similarly, there were tell-tale signs of American intervention in several key events in the nation’s life that shaped its destiny, like the allegedly CIA-sponsored air crash leading to the death of Homi J. Bhabha, father of India’s nuclear programme. If he were alive, India would possibly have achieved its present nuclear capabilities several decades earlier, with cheap power triggering Asia’s industrial revolution not on the eastern coast of China but on Indian soil.
And now, it seems to be China’s turn to do its bit. In this space last week, I described China as India’s “dangerous” neighbour. Dangerous, because it poses serious security risk. It is building roads that can bring its artillery right up to the border of the Indian state of Sikkim, with its bulldozers that were at work in the territory of Bhutan, a tiny mountainous country that depends on India for its foreign relations and external security. In China’s perception, India is a weakling, a perception born out of its 1962 experience, yet India cuts a profile high enough for a hit on it to reverberate across the world as a demonstration of the Dragon’s might.
However, China, like America and Russia in the past, has also emerged as a player on the chequerboard of India’s internal politics. Apparently, it is rattled by the rise of Prime Minister Narendra Modi on the global stage, as a decisive leader of India’s 130 million people who carries no ideological baggage that hamstrung the country’s previous rulers. And, like the USSR in the past, it has kept a close watch not just on Modi but the entire political spectrum, and must have observed the extent of antipathy towards him that some of the opposition leaders, notably the top leaders of the Congress party, harbour against him. There are reasons for China to be soft towards the Congress as, under its leadership, India resolutely desisted from crossing the red line in response to various urgings from America to be a party to the mission to contain China.
But India under Modi has shown more spunk than what makes Beijing’s tolerance limit. It has joined in strategic partnership with Japan, Australia, Vietnam and the US—countries that are worried by China’s flexing of naval muscle on the maritime rights of all over South China Sea. In 2008, the US gave India the legal right to build on its civilian nuclear capabilities despite being a nuclear nation and a non-signatory to NPT. But it was an ineffective largesse as India was not a member of the exclusive Nuclear Suppliers’ Group (NSG); without its nod, it is not possible to obtain either nuclear fuel or technology. For over two years now, China, as an NSG member, has made it its mission to stall India’s entry into the all-important nuclear marketplace.
Differences arose even on issues related to terror as China, as member of the 15-strong UNSC, flatly refused to ban Masood Azhar, head of terror group Jaish-e-Muhammad, which had attacked Indian parliament in 2001 and the Air Force base at Pathankot in 2016. It was China’s gift to Pakistan in exchange of the latter’s help in mobilising members of the Organisation of Islamic Nations (OIC) in support of China. And of course for gleefully offering China land to build rail and road communication from Kashgar, the oasis city in Xinjiang, to Gwadar port in Pakistan’s Baluchistan. Interestingly, the more Modi sought to befriend the US, the more China began putting pressure on him. It multiplied as Modi’s global image got enlarged, the latest being his historic red-carpet reception in Israel as the first Indian PM in that country. The irritation of his critics at home rose in direct proportion to China’s hostility. It was as if some of them were enjoying India’s humiliation. This is enigmatic, because Jawaharlal Nehru, the first Congress PM, was a victim of China's deliberate betrayal: he had taken China as friend, but was betrayed by an aggression of unmatched ferocity. Unable to bear the shock, he died within two years. However, in what remains of his family, there are elements making money by exporting handicraft and other objects to China against unrealistically high invoice, and some party leaders close to the family have strong Chinese links.
It is likely that the recent Chinese hostility north of Sikkim had a bearing on the Congress-led move to unite the opposition parties in India against Modi. And, as the opposition unity effort tends to fizzle out, it is a Chinese gambit that looks like having gone for a toss. The stand off in the Doklam area, therefore, may end sooner than expected. No wonder Modi and Chinese president X Jinping, in their meeting at the G20 summit in Hamburg last Friday, held a brief talk on the side line, disproving Beijing’s hawkish bureaucrats who’d discounted the chance of a meeting. But everyone was happy as they shook hands. The only unhappy soul was Congress vice president Rahul Gandhi who snarled: “Why is Modi silent on China?”