by Harish Gupta, National Editor, Lokmat Group
India's nuclear malady is a spin-off from global politics. After 2004, it became clear that, for evolved democracies like the US, it is no longer possible to send troops to foreign lands, the political price of even a single citizen's life being unbearably high. So, with the US troop withdrawal from Afghanistan in the background, the American leadership began paying a lot of attention to fixing the riddle canon that is South Asia, and specially that of India.
Having blasted a nuclear bomb in the Cold War era, India had become untouchable to the technologically advanced West, led by the US. But, with the old ideological demons gone by the time it was a new century, America began looking for ways to get India baptized, for she alone had the capability, and experience, to police the huge Afghanistan-Pakistan (Af-Pak) badlands following US exit. It resulted in the 2008 Indo-US civil nuclear agreement and the one-time nod of the 48-member Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). The Indo-US deal reopened many other doors for India to import nuclear material and uranium through a chain of similar agreements—with Russia, France, UK, South Korea seven other countries.
Still NSG has not finally opened its door. And that's despite Prime Minister Narendra Modi's fervent lobbying not only with America but with virtually every power in the world, including China, the most unflinching opponent to India's entry. NSG's plenary committee is meeting in Seoul on June 24, and many members, including the US and the UK, want India in. But entry to the club is based on consensus, not voting. Secondly, India is unlikely to be able to get a foot in its door as long as China remains an opponent. China says India is disqualified because it is not a signatory to NPT. In fact China is backing Pakistan, a known proliferator, as NSG candidate. The logic is severely flawed. China waited three decades to become NPT member and even after that its fingerprint is visible in the spread of nuclear technology to Pakistan, North Korea and Iran. Its non-proliferation credentials were downright murky when it secured NSG membership in 2004. Besides, there is no iron rule that an NSG member must sign NPT first. What is often forgotten is that one of the objectives of NSG, when it was formed in 1974, was to accommodated super-power like France that had not signed NPT till then. Nor did Japan ratify NPT even though it is a founder-member of NSG. In blocking India, China is clearly playing on its military and economic clout vis-a-vis the US and is confident that the latter will blink.
If India is kept out of NSG, the world will lose in two ways. First, with China so uncompromising in its attitude, India cannot but be persuaded to shelve its future plan to ratify NPT. That heightens global risk of a nuclear showdown as India will be under no compulsion to either limit its stockpile of fissile material under Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT), or to voluntarily join a risk-reducing mechanism like Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). Besides, it will derail India's ambitious plan to augment its nuclear power production to 14,600 MW in 2024 and 63,000 MW by 2032 (that is, 16 years from now). It is an essential pre-condition for India to step down its high carbon-di-oxide emission. For a country of India's rising hunger for energy, nuclear power is the only clean, green and stable answer. But India's capacity to make enough nuclear power limped through all these years due to the crippling post-1974 sanctions. India's present 21 reactors produce just 5,300 MW power. The exponential growth of nuclear energy the country envisages can be stuck more on the supply of uranium, the raw material, than technology. There is not too much restriction on inflow of foreign-made reactors, nor is there any major shortage of local skill and expertise, but it is the uranium market which is tightly held by NSG. Perhaps that explains why Prime Minister Modi is in regular contact with Australia, world's largest uranium source. It is mollycoddling even Namibia, the uranium-rich African nation and despatched President Pranab Mukherjee on two-day visit.
India’s current quest for uranium is largely spurred by the fact that there are too many reactors soon going online—six in the next couple of years. We are not only buying shiploads of uranium from wherever possible—Argentina, Kazhakstan, Uzbekistan—but creating a reserve for future emergency. But that is old thinking which is being discarded. For the exponential growth in nuclear energy, India is now depending on thorium, the metal which is abundantly available locally. The future plan is based on reactors with thorium cycles. The idea is to first gather plutonium from a Pressurized Heavy Water Reactor (PWHR), then, in the next stage, use fast neutron reactors to burn the plutonium with a blanket around its core having both uranium and thorium, to obtain high-fissile plutonium and U233, the fissile isotope of uranium. In the final stage, an Advanced Heavy Water Reactor (AHWR) is made to burn plutonium-thorium fuel to breed U233 in a manner that makes it a self-sustaining fissile driver for a battery of AHWRs, generating electricity without addition of new fuel.
This strategy got regulatory approval in 2002 but missed two deadlines so far. Throughout the UPA period, there was systematic needling from the government, including the all-powerful Bhaba Atomic Research Commission (BARC) to put roadblocks. In a world where obtaining nuclear fuel depends on the whims of an ill-mannered neighbour, thorium is the way forward for India.
